In the years since Daniel Dennett"s influential Consciousness Explained was published in 1991, scientific research on consciousness has been a hotly contested battleground of rival theories - "so rambunctious," Dennett observes, "that several people are writing books just about the tumult." With Sweet Dreams, Dennett returns to the subject for "revision and renewal" of his theory of consciousness, taking into account major empirical advances in the field since 1991 as well as recent theoretical challenges.

In Sweet Dreams, Dennett recasts his Multiple Drafts Model of consciousness as the "fame in the brain" model, as a background against which to examine the philosophical issues that "continue to bedevil the field." With his usual clarity and brio, Dennett enlivens his arguments with a variety of vivid examples. He isolates the "Zombie Hunch" that distorts much of the theorizing of both philosophers and scientists, and defends heterophenomenology, his "third-person" approach to the science of consciousness, against persistent misinterpretations and objections. The old challenge of Frank Jackson"s thought experiment about Mary the color scientist is given a new rebuttal in the form of "RoboMary," and his discussion of a famous card trick, "The Tuned Deck," is designed to show that David Chalmers"s Hard Problem is probably just a figment of theorists" misexploited imagination. In the final essay, the "intrinsic" nature of "qualia" is compared with the naively imagined "intrinsic value" of a dollar in "Consciousness - How Much Is That in Real Money?" Это и многое другое вы найдете в книге Sweet Dreams: Philosophical Obstacles to a Science of Consciousness (Daniel C. Dennett)